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Introduction
Executive remuneration practices in publicly listed firms is a topic of controversy debated by the public as well as firms' stakeholders since years (Murphy 2013 , Economist 2015 . Recently, a possible response to that (but also to more broadly defined corporate governance issues) considered by regulators worldwide is to increase shareholder engagement (Fairfax 2013 , EuropeanCommission 2013 . Accordingly, "Say on Pay" (SoP), i.e. direct voting of shareholders on executive compensation during the general annual meeting (AGM), has received significant attention over last years. First established in the UK in 2003, a number of countries have followed suit Elst 2014, Behrmann and Sassen 2015) .
Public listing of equity comes along with a separation of ownership and control and thus with agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Indeed, around the world regulators thus have established standard mechanisms to mitigate these costs: Shareholders are invited to participate in AGMs and to elect nonexecutive directors that hire (and fire) executives. Non-executive directors negotiate with executives over their contracts and their compensation. Effectively, the idea is that shareholders elect delegate their power to non-executives, which then act on the behalf of shareholders. Taking this view, why should SoP be an efficient mechanism to solve potential agency issues related to executive compensation policies, given that the AGM elects the non-executive board members, which negotiate contracts with executive?
One view is that the non-executive director mechanism in effect replaces the initial principal-agent relation (shareholders vs. managers) by two principal-agent relations (shareholders vs. non-executives and nonexecutives vs. managers). Thus, again there are agency issues, in particular with regard to executive compensation policies (e.g. (Bebchuk and Fried 2003) ). Another view is that there might be agency issues among the group of shareholders (e.g. (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) ). With heterogeneity in shareholder interests, direct votes during the AGM may create incentives for (small) shareholders to engage more actively in AGMs and thus to more directly express their views on corporate policies. However, this also creates the threat of shareholder clientele issues and faces non-executive directors with probably incompatible interests of different shareholder groups.
With these conflicts in mind, there are many proponents of (mandatory) SoP votes during AGMs (for an overview see (Thomas, Palmiter and Cotter 2012) ). However, while the idea of SoP seems appealing on the back of these arguments, effectively the governance mechanism is costly from the perspective of the firm (balancing the various shareholder interests, probably resulting in economically inefficient compromises) as well as from the perspective of (small) shareholders (the cost of collecting information and engaging in the AGM). Acknowledging that SoP votes come with costs and benefits, one potential regulatory option is to allow for voluntary SoP votes. Such a voluntary SoP regime would be efficient from the regulator's perspective, if three conditions are fulfilled:
(i) (some) shareholders consider managerial remuneration policies as a part of the agency problem of listed firms (as opposed to the outcome of a bargaining process at arm's length) with firms exposed to high agency costs opting for a voluntary SoP vote,
(ii) voluntary SoP votes will increase AGM participation of (small) shareholders, and (iii) for firms precipitating a SoP vote, the process of aligning incentives will be assessed by the principals, and will therefore facilitate the alignment of interests between the management board and shareholders ultimately strengthening pay-for-performance
In this paper, we aim to contribute to that debate by studying (1) determinants and approval rates of voluntary SoP votes, as well as (2) sation systems in place. 1 We examine the results of this regulatory enactment by studying the occurrence and outcome of SoP votes as well as their impact on AGM participation. Therefore, we examine 1,169
Annual General Meetings (AGMs) of all German Prime Standard listed firms with close to 10,000 agenda items over the period 2010 -2013 . Over these four years of SoP history, we find that just over half of all firms in our sample have precipitated SoP votes at one of their AGMs. Overall, more than one in five AGMs included a SoP vote.
In our empirical study, we proceed in three steps. First, we follow previous studies (Rapp, Sperling and Wolff 2010 , Drefahl and Pelger 2013 , Eulerich, Kalinichenko and Theis 2014 , conducting a (mainly cross sectional) analysis on the determinants of the propensity to grant shareholders SoP votes. At the same time, we analyse the determinants of the propensity to opt out of detailed executive compensation disclosure. In line with previous studies, we find increasing propensity for SoP with firm size and free float.
Beyond this, we link the propensity for SoP to excess compensation and find that abnormal pay increases the propensity for a voluntary SoP vote. Not very surprisingly, we find reverse effects for the same specifications when explaining the limited disclosure opt out. We interpret these results as evidence suggesting that firms use voluntary SoP to gain legitimation for executive remuneration policies in firms with presumably high agency conflicts.
Second, we look at approval rates of SoP votes. In an ordinary least squares setting we find that ownership concentration is positively associated with approval rates. 2 In an AGM fixed effects specification, which we use to address potential selection issues, we find that approval rates for SoP votes are lower than for the AGM average agenda item. When we differentiate between firms with concentrated ownership and widely held firms, differences are much stronger in widely held firms. These results are consistent with 1 Note that (currently) SoP votes in Germany are purely advisory, with no resulting legal obligation to take action for the supervisory board. Even though there are no direct legal implications, a negative vote outcome is assumed to have significant impact through negative reputation and publicity. As other countries implemented compulsory SoP votes, some of them binding, there is an ongoing debate about the design of SoP votes in Germany. In 2013 the United Kingdom introduced compulsory SoP votes (at least every three years) (Behrmann and Sassen 2015) . While Germany failed to introduce compulsory SoP in 2013 (Velte 2014) , the current government, nevertheless, included the intention to put compensation proposals of the supervisory board in front of shareholders in their coalition agreement (CDU, CSU and SPD 2013) .
2 Also comparable to prior findings, see (Rapp, Sperling and Wolff 2010, Drefahl and Pelger 2013) the view that (small) shareholders consider executive compensation a part of the agency problem of listed firms.
Third, we study AGM participation rates. Using firm-fixed effects models, which allow for (constant) unobserved heterogeneity across firms, we find on average no evidence that AGM participation increases whenever the firm has scheduled a SoP vote. However, once we differentiate between firms with concentrated ownership and widely held firms, we find that in widely held firms AGM participation indeed increases with SoP votes. Our results indicate SoP can increase participation rates, but only for widely held firms, as in these firms (small) shareholders consider SoP votes as a possibility to actively influence corporate decisions.
Finally, we analyse if there is a lasting effect on the alignment of interests between the management board and shareholders. For this analysis we introduce new compensation data based on (Rapp and Wolff 2014) covering the years between 2006 to 2013. While the levels of total compensation remain little to unaltered by SoP votes, we do find an increase in the relative levels of share-based incentives within the total amount of executive compensation per person on the board.
Overall, our results are consistent with the view that firms use voluntary SoPV to gain legitimation for executive remuneration policies in firms with low ownership concentration, where (small) shareholders consider executive compensation a part of the agency problem of listed firms, and where (small) shareholders consider SoP votes as a possibility of actively influencing corporate decisions. While the discussion on the costs and benefits of SoP, its effect on executive compensation and the alignment of interest between management boards and shareholders will continue, our study adds to the discussion with insights into a broad data set and novel analyses. Specifically, it proposes a novel -less biased -way to look at SoP approval rates, suggests examining the impact of SoP votes on AGM participation rates, as well as analysing SoP and executive compensation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a theoretical background and elaborates the hypothesis to be analysed empirically. Chapter 3 describes the dataset underlying our empirical analysis, presents the variables used and reports descriptive analysis. In chapter 4, we then introduce our methodological approach and present the results of the analysis. The last part concludes with a summary of the results, provides an outlook and open questions.
SoP evolution, theoretical background and hypotheses
In this section, we will firstly provide an overview of the theoretical background on SoP, as well as a brief survey of the existing literature. Secondly, based on the existing theoretical context and status quo of the literature, we will develop our key hypotheses, as the foundation to our empirical work.
SoP evolution, theoretical background and survey of existing SoP literature
Over the last years, say on pay (SoP) has been given increased focus, as more legislation is passed, to provide investors with institutionalised means to vote, and thereby express their views, on executive com- Larcker, et al. 2012 ).
In view of those supporting SoP, the practice of submitting compensation plans to shareholder approval, increases the accountability of executives and management board members to shareholders. This view stems from the ideas of an executive management team acting at its own discretion, with interests not necessarily aligned with a widely dispersed group of public shareholders (Berle and Means 1932) . Ideally, optimally designed contracts would help alleviate the inherent principal-agent conflicts, and incentivise the executive management to act in the interest of shareholders, maximising the firms' value (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . However, when taking into account the "Managerial Power" approach, there are commentators, suggesting that (small) shareholders consider executive compensation a part of the agency problem of listed firms, as opposed the outcome of a bargaining process at arm's length Fried 2003, Bebchuk and Fried 2004) . In this context, SoP provides shareholders with institutionalised means, on voicing their views on the executive compensation of their firm.
Comparing the different legislative models for SoP, the individual approach is influenced by the regulatory environment and local corporate governance functions. One of the key differences in corporate governance systems are the board structures (one tier vs. two-tiered board). The SoP models also vary significantly (Döll 2009, Behrmann and Sassen 2015) . Differences are reflected in the substance of the vote, i.e.
individual compensation packages vs. the compensation of the board or the matter put to vote (the compensation reports as opposed to the compensation system). Further distinctions are the frequency, whether the votes are legally mandated or held on a voluntary basis, and the votes' implications: is the vote outcome binding or purely advisory.
In Germany SoP was introduced in 2009. 3 The German corporate governance model with a two-tiered board structure foresees the development of the executive board compensation policy as well as individual compensation packages in the hand of the supervisory board. The SoP model introduced encourages corporations to hold non-binding votes on SoP. A vote can be precipitated by the executive board itself, on a voluntary basis, as well as on demand by certain shareholders. 4 The content of the vote is the complete 4 For a shareholder to request a SoP vote, the demand must be delivered to the company at least 30 days prior to the shareholder meeting and the shareholder must hold at least one-twentieth of the share capital or represent and amount of the share capital corresponding to EUR 500,000. See German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz AktG), §122 compensation package of the members of the executive board, as the supervisory board has put in place.
The law follows the EC-Recommendation of December 14, 2004 closely. 5 As the legislative environment on SoP is changing rapidly, the United Kingdom introduced a binding SoP vote, mandatory at least every three years (Department for Business 2013) the debate has also reached other countries including Germany. The previous government had decided the introduction of a new law, making an annual SoP vote compulsory, but the introduction failed in the second chamber of parliament (Velte 2014) . Also the current coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats has set the goal to let the AGM vote on executive compensation in the future (CDU, CSU and SPD 2013) . We therefore anticipate
SoP to continue to gain in importance in the compensations setting process.
As SoP is a relatively new practice, the empirical analysis on the subject is only building. The introduction has however sparked a flurry of publications on various perspectives. One way to approach SoP is to analyse the market reaction when the introduction of a SoP regime is first introduced. In the UK, markets viewed the introduction of SoP positive, for firms with weak penalties for poor performance (Ferri and Maber 2009 ). Analogue to the UK in the US, the results for firms with high abnormal executive compensation and low pay-for-performance sensitivity are positive. However, the market reacts negatively to labour sponsored SoP vote requests and positively when they are defeated (Cai and Walkling 2011) . Evidence in Germany implies a negative reaction to the introduction of SoP (Hitz and Müller-Bloch 2015) .
Results indicate firms are particularly affected if board members receive high abnormal remuneration, corroborating the perspectives from other countries that regulation can be beneficial for some, while potentially imposing inefficient contracts on others. even driving executives out of office. In a cross-country study (Correa and Lel 2014) , CEO compensation levels are found be lower in countries with SoP laws, compared to CEO compensation levels in countries with no SoP laws, partly resulting from lower growth rates. In addition SoP, is associated with higher pay for performance sensitivity, a lower CEO pay gap (compared to the rest of the executive board), and a higher firm value.
A further point of debate is whether SoP should be made compulsory or if firms should be able to precipitate SoP votes on a voluntary basis. In an experimental setting, SoP is found to have positive impact on investor sentiment and trust (Bowlin, Christ and Griffin 2012) . However, the effect is seen to be stronger, when SoP is precipitated on a voluntary basis.
In Germany, so far the attention has been on which firms decide to precipitate a shareholder votes and the voting behaviour of shareholders. Initial research after the year of introduction found positive influences of ownership dispersion and media presence on the propensity to grant shareholders of Prime Standard 6 companies a SoP (Rapp, Sperling and Wolff 2010, Eulerich, Rapp and Wolff 2012) . In a similar study, variable compensation is found to increase the likelihood for SoP and disapproval is likely for firms with transparent disclosure (Drefahl and Pelger 2013 
Key hypotheses
We will now present the hypotheses we test in our analysis, first looking at the propensity to precipitate SoP votes, moving to SoP and approval rates, and finally concluding the section with AGM participation and approval rates.
Hypotheses regarding the likelihood SoP votes being precipitated
Larger shareholders or blockholders have a substantial influence on the development of a firm and can therefore take on a control function as part of the governance structure of a company (Gillan 2006, Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . As a result, it is much easier for the board to take the views of larger blockholders into account, when putting a compensation system in place. In contrast, when shareholder base is more dispersed, it will be more difficult for the supervisory board to engage with shareholders on their views of the appropriate compensation system. As a result, and based on previous findings (Rapp, Sperling and Wolff 2010 , Drefahl and Pelger 2013 , Eulerich, Kalinichenko and Theis 2014 , we would expect SoP votes to be more likely in larger firms with a more dispersed shareholder base (greater free float): shareholders and the supervisory board) suggest this. Granting a SoP vote provides shareholders, and in particular smaller shareholders, a unique opportunity to express their views on the existing executive compensation system. However, unlike with most other items on the AGM agenda, the outcome of SoP is not legally binding. A negative, or less positive, outcome will at the most have disciplining consequences to potentially powerful executives (Bebchuk and Fried 2003) . As the power of executives increases, proxied by higher free float and measures for comparably high compensation, shareholders would be expected to step up to their control function and oppose executives. We therefore formulate our hypothesis SoP voting behaviour as follows:
H3: With shareholders considering compensation of powerful executives as part of firms' inherent agency costs, SoP vote approval is decreasing in free float of shares and abnormal pay of executives.
7 Based on German Stock Corporation Act (AktG §87)
SoP and AGM participation
The AGM being a core element of the governance of public corporations with a dispersed shareholder base, the higher the potential to influence the development of the firm the more important the AGM will become. As the importance of the AGM will increase, the incentives for shareholders to participate will be rise. The introduction of SoP can be viewed precisely as increasing the AGMs relative importance in the Governance of the company, in particular with respect to governing executive compensation. As a result,
we are inclined to test:
H4: With SoP votes allowing shareholders to express their views on executive compensation arrangements, SoP votes
will increase AGM participation in widely held firms.
SoP and executive compensation
As a key element of evaluating SoP from the regulatory perspective, is the question of the impact on executive compensation itself. While there are many factors influencing absolute executive compensation levels, we would expect to see an increased alignment of interests between the executive board and shareholders. A primary instrument to achieve this alignment of interests consist of providing a larger share of compensation equity/share based, thereby increasing the pay for performance sensitivity of total compensation to the performance of the firm. In this context we develop the following hypothesis:
H5: With SoP votes allowing shareholders to express their views on executive compensation arrangements, SoP votes will contribute to a further alignment of interests between executive boards and shareholders, leading to an increase
in pay for performance sensitivity.
Sample description and descriptive analysis
This section describes our sample, the variables and provides some descriptive analysis of SoP votes in three steps. First, Section 3.1 documents the sample construction process. Next, Section 3.2 introduces our main variables of interest (SoP vote, SoP approval, AGM participation, and Limited Disclosure and executive compensation and pay for performance sensitivity) and discusses their descriptive statistics. Finally, Section 3.3 presents firm characteristics, proxies of ownership structures and measures of abnormal pay.
Sample construction
In August To derive our sample, we start from all Prime Standard constituents and proceed as illustrated in 
AGM participation, SoP votes, approval rates and executive compensation
Reading the minutes of our sample AGMs, we code information on (i) AGM participation, (ii) the type of the various agenda items 8 and (iii) the approval rate for each agenda item. Overall, we collect information on 10,308 agenda items throughout our sample AGMs. This information allows us to study the occurrence of voluntary SoP votes, their approval rates, and the effect of SoP votes on AGM participation.
Firstly, we look at a binary variable SoP vote measuring whether a say on pay vote was held at the AGM.
If a say on pay vote was held, the variable takes a 1, if the AGM agenda of the firm did not include a say on pay vote, the variable takes the value 0. Overall, we observe 239 SoP votes in our sample 9 of the total 8 We use a categorisation with 17 agenda item groups: 1 Reporting for the financial year, 2 Appropriation of profits, 3 Approval of actions of the executive board, 4 Approval of actions of the supervisory board, 5 Mandating supervisory board members, 6 Man-dating of auditor, 7 Say-on-Pay, 8 Compensations system supervisory board, 9 Detailed executive compensation disclosure opt out, 10 Authorization of share buyback, 11 Authorized capital, 12 Conditional capital, 13 Capital increase, 14 Other, 15 Changes to articles of association, 16 Conditional capital for compensation purposes, 17 Liquidation of the corporation 9 Three companies in 2010 (Stada Arzneimittel AG, Vossloh AG and Kloeckner & Co. SE) only update shareholders on the status quo of the boards' compensation system and specifically grant shareholders room for their opinion under a separate agenda item, without holding a vote. In 2011, Phoenix Solar intends to hold a say on pay vote, however no 1,169 AGMs, which corresponds to a SoP occurrence rate of some 20%. Considering that we have an (unbalanced) panel, it is interesting to take a firm perspective: We find every second firm has had a SoP vote during our sample period (170 out of 335 sample firms). Taking the time series perspective is also interesting: Some 13% (2%) of our sample firms have more than one (more than two) SoP votes during our sample period of four years. Moreover, along the time series dimension the distribution of SoP votes is uneven as illustrated in tungen" or "VorstOG"), which forces firms to disclose detailed individualized information about remuneration of executives. However, the law allows firms (and their boards) to opt-out of the disclosure requirements: The board may propose the AGM to vote on a limited disclosure proposal and whenever more than three forth of the AGM vote in favour for this proposal, the firm does not have to disclose detailed information on executive remuneration within the next five years.
We identify firms that take advantage of this possibility to "opt-out" of detailed disclosure, by carefully Secondly, we look at the various agenda items. Overall, we identify 10,308 agenda items in our sample of 1,169 AGMs, i.e. nearly 9 agenda items per sample AGM. We categorize 17 agenda item groups 11 . For 9,324 of these agenda items 12 we are able to collect the approval rates, i.e. the voting outcome. 13 These approval rates are reported in Table 4 . What is evident from looking at Table 4 is that the approval rate is very high on average. However, with the decline in SoP vote numbers, there also appears to be a decline in approval rates towards the end of the sample period. 
Firm characteristics and control variables
In the empirical analysis, we aim to control for various firm characteristics. Accounting-based firm characteristics are gathered via Thomson Worldscope database. Using this database, we define variables to control for the following set of characteristics: firm size, capital structure, TobinsQ, operating performance, asset base as well as the firms' innovation capacity. For firm size (Firm Size) we use the natural logarithm of total revenues. Differences in capital structures are accounted for using the firms' leverage ratios as calculated by the share total debt to total assets (Leverage). For the valuation aspects, we calculate TobinsQ as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets (total assets plus market capitalisation less common equity, over total assets) (TobinsQ). As the operating performance measure, we compute a proxy for the return on invested capital (ROIC), based on the operating income (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) less the taxes paid in the relevant fiscal year over the firms total assets (Operating Performance). We hold constant for the firms' asset structure by deriving the total fixed assets to total assets ratios (Fixed Assets). Finally, innovation capacity measured by the research and development expenditure normalised by total assets (RnD). We furthermore assume research and development expenditure is equal to zero if data is not available.
To account for the different impact on corporate decision-making processes by the media status of the firm, we specify four different media presence levels. The key assumption is, the more prominent the index in which the firm is listed, the more media focus the firm will receive. The variable media presence therefore takes the value 0 for firms listed in the Prime Standard segment. However, if a firm is listed in an index, the variable takes on the value 1 for TecDAX, 2 for SDAX, 3 for MDAX and 4 for DAX membership.
We control for industry and time effects in all specifications, with the former based on the primary Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes, providing 10 industry groups. The latter measure providing four dummies, one for each year of sample data. As there is no publicly available database on corporate governance variables in Germany, we use a unique database containing detailed hand collected information on corporate ownership. The database rests on information from the Hoppestedt Aktienführer, annual reports, the Lexis-Nexis database as well as press searches and investor relations department inquiries.
Using this database, we measure the share ownership held by the largest three shareholders (whenever they exceed 5 percent) measured by Blockholdings. We further distinguish between insider and outsider ownership in the firm. We therefore form the variable Inside ownership, for any ownership associated with members of the management of the firm, Outside ownership, measuring share in ownership of the largest three block holders not part of the executive board.
Additionally we use compensation data based on the sample presented by Rapp & Wolff, 2014 
to estimate
Exess Compensation as a measure of abnormal pay. Using the natural log of executive compensation observed historically we estimate excess executive compensation for our sample of firms. We use a twostaged process, in which we first explain Excess Compensation using Firm Size as well as industry and year effects. In a second specification, we add TobinsQ, the firms Operating Performance, as dummy indicating if the compensation included stock based incentives, as well as Blockholdings.
In Table 7 , we report summary statistics for the underlying data. The table displays the number of observations in the whole sample, as well as mean, median, the 25% and 75% quartiles and the variables' standard deviations. We also compute means for the group of firms holding say on pay votes and those that opted not to do so. Table 6 reports summary statistics for the sample underlying the analysis. The sample consists of firms listed in the Prime Standard between 2010 and 2013. Firm size it the natural logarithm of the firms revenues. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Operating performance measures the firms earnings from operations by calculating NOPAT over total assets as EBIT -taxes paid divided by total assets. Fixed Assets is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets for the year for which the AGM is held. RnD is the reported research and development expenditure normalised by total assets, and assumed to be zero if no numbers no research and development expenditure is reported. Media presence takes the value 0 for firms listed in the Prime Standard segment. However, if a firm is listed in an index, the variable takes on the value 1 for TecDAX, 2 for SDAX, 3 for MDAX and 4 for DAX membership. Blockownership represents the share of combined stakes of the largest three shareholders. Inside ownership measures the stake in the firm held by the management board and Outside ownership are the stakes of the largest three shareholders, not part of the management. All variables are based on the financial year immediately preceding the AGM. Accounting data is winsorised at a one percent level. Stars denote statistical significance levels with * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Empirical results
This section presents our empirical analysis. We proceed in three steps. We start by analysing the propensity of SoP votes in Section 4.1. Next, we examine SoP approval rates in Section 4.2. Finally, we study the influence of SoP on AGM participation rates in Section 4.3. In each section, we describe the empirical design, present the results, as well as the robustness of the analyses.
Determinants of SoP Votes and Disclosure of Executive Remuneration Policies
In this section, we examine cross-sectional determinants of SoP votes and disclosure levels of executive remuneration policies.
Empirical design
To study the determinants of the propensity for SoP, we classify our sample of AGMs using the dummy variable SoP Vote indicating (with the value 1) that a vote took place at the AGM. Otherwise, the variable is equal to zero. We then use our firm characteristics, ownership proxies, as well as compensation metrics to calculate the probability of SoP taking place. Using Logit regression methods (Hoetker 2007, Stock and Watson 2007) our empirical model reads as follows:
Empirical Model 1:
where i indicates firms and t refers to the time series. Thereby, firm characteristics comprise year and industry fixed effects, the latter based on the first digit SIC codes. Effectively, we assume firm specific, unobserved factors are largely captured by the firms' industry affiliation. We use robust standard errors to allow for heteroskedasticity (White 1980 , Freedman 2006 ).
In a second step, analogue to SoP vote, we form a dummy indicating those firms limiting the disclosure of detailed management compensation information (Limited disclosure). Similar to the analysis of SoP Votes, we model the propensity to limit disclosure of management compensation information using firm characteristics, ownership proxies and compensation metrics using the following empirical model:
Empirical Model 2:
Again, we use industry and year fixed effects, assuming firm specific, unobserved factors are largely captured by firm industry affiliation. Robust standard errors allowing for heteroskedasticity are used for statistical inference.
Empirical results
The results of various versions of Empirical Model 1 are reported in Table 8 . In an initial implementation of model (1), we regress SoP Vote on Firm Size and industry and year dummies. Next, we add in various steps other firm controls, ownership proxies, the proxy for media presence and our measures of abnormal pay. In Specification 3 to 6, we add Media presence as an additional control. The idea is that higher media presence comes along with higher levels of public attention concerning executive compensation and thus increasing public pressure to gain legitimation for executive remuneration policies. However, media presence turns out to be significant only in Specification 3.
With respect to ownership, we find that Blockholdings, as well as Inside Ownership and Outside Ownership, are negatively associated with the propensity to grant SoP votes. This is, again, in line with prior literature on voluntary SoP votes in Germany, e.g. (Rapp, Sperling and Wolff 2010) . We interpret this evidence as supportive for our first hypotheses (H1) stating that as managerial power is expected to be larger in firms with less concentrated ownership and rent extraction potential is higher in large firms, the propensity of SoP vote is increasing in firm size and free float of shares. Furthermore, the results imply firms are prone to higher accountability for Excess compensation. This could point at the supervisory boards' efforts to get shareholders to sign off compensation packages that are above expected levels. In sum, our results are consistent with the view that firms use voluntary SoP votes to gain legitimation for executive remuneration policies.
Next, we examine what we consider somehow opposing the idea of SoP votes: limited disclosure of executive compensation policies. Therefore, we apply the same specifications as above to our proxy Limited disclosure, i.e. to Empirical Model 2. Results of this exercise are reported in Table 9 . Table 8 reports Logit estimates of our model (2) explaining the propensity to opt out of disclosure of detailed management compensation. Our sample covers all firms listed in the Prime Standard between 2010 and 2013. Limited disclosure variable measures whether the firm reported non-compliance in its statement of conformity on the German Corporate Governance Code. Across all models, the variable equals 1 if the firm reported non-compliance. To accommodate for a binary dependent variable we use a Logit specification. Our main explanatory variables are Blockholders, Inside-, and Outside Blockholder, Media presence, Excess compensation and Excess compensation (extended) . In the analysis we use a set of firm characteristics (Firm size, TobinsQ, Operating performance, Fixed Assets, RnD Expenses, winsorised at a one percent level) as well as year and industry effects. The latter based on the first digit SIC code. Robust Z-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficients, allowing for heteroskedasticity using the Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance (White, 1980) . Our goodness of fit measure is the pseudo R2.
*, **, *** Significance is at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Source: Own preparation Table 9 : Determinants of limited disclosure of executive compensation practices Not very surprisingly, the coefficients of our key right hand side variables are pretty much opposite to the ones found when examining SoP votes. Indeed, while firm size is negatively associated with opaqueness of compensation practices, the association of ownership concentration is positive. These results are consistent with the view that boards of (small) firms with large, probably influential, blockholders aim to negotiate executive compensation contracts privately.
Robustness tests
In order to check the validity of our results, we challenge them in three (unreported) steps. First, we reestimate the models using alternative Firm size variables, including the natural logarithm of market capitalisation and the natural logarithm of total assets. Second, we follow the main approach of the corporate governance literature and restrict the sample to non-financial and non-utility firms (i.e. we exclude firms classified by SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 as well as between 4900 and 4949). Third, we estimate the average marginal effects (at means). Our key results prove robust under all these additional tests.
Approval rates and SoP
Having studied the occurrence of voluntary SoP votes, we now examine approval rates of these votes.
Empirical design
A simple (and naive) analysis of SoP approval rates is to regress the voting outcome on variables of interest and controls, i.e. an empirical model as follows: In any case, any association found using Empirical Model 3 is to be treated with caution due to endogeneity issues (Stock and Watson 2007) . Indeed, any meaningful analysis of approval rates of voluntary SoP votes must deal with two issues. First, the occurrence of voluntary SoP votes is an endogenous choice by the board of the firm (see the analysis in Section 4.1). Second, participation in AGMs is probably an endogenous choice by shareholders (see the analysis in Section 4.3).
In our empirical analysis, we proceed in two steps. First, we run a cross-sectional version of Empirical Model 3. Second, we adopt a very different approach. Instead of studying the cross-sectional variation in
SoP approval rates, we compare SoP approval rates with an AGM's average approval rate. By allowing for AGM fixed effects, we are able to address the two challenges described above. Specifically, allowing constant AGM participation. Thus, our second empirical model to study SoP vote approval rates reads as follows:
Empirical Model 4:
where k indicates the various agenda items that require shareholders' approval and Governance Proxies will measure ownership concentration and Excess AGM participation. 14 We estimate versions of Empirical
Model 4 on the sample of all AGMs, as well as on subsamples: AGMs of firms paying relatively high (low) executive compensations as measured by our variable Excess Compensation (extended). Again as in the last models, we use robust standard errors that allow for heteroskedasticity for statistical inference (White, 1980; Freedman, 2006) .
Explaining SoP approval rates
The results of the analysis on SoP approval rates are reported in Notes: Table 9 reports OLS and AGM fixed effects estimates of our model (3) explaining the AGM approval rates. Our sample covers all firms listed in the Prime Standard between 2010 and 2013. For the 1,169 observed AGMs, we analyse 9,324 observed AGM agenda items with a voting outcome. We thereby measure approval as the sum of votes in favour of the AGM agenda item in question, over the total number of votes submitted. To account for any kind of heterogeneity between different AGMs in our sample we introduce AGM fixed effects. Our main explanatory variable is SoP, to determine the influence of SoP vote on the approval rate. We furthermore introduce a Widely Held dummy indicating whether the firms' three largest shareholders own less than 50% of all voting rights (taking on the value one if this is the case and zero otherwise, i.e. when the free float is less than fifty percent). Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficients, allowing for heteroskedasticity using the Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance (White, 1980) . Our goodness of fit measure is the R2.
Source: Own preparation Table 10 : SoP approval rates, relative to other AGM agenda items
The first specification in Table 10 is a (mainly cross-sectional) OLS-version of Empirical Model 3: Based on the results of 232 SoP votes we find that SoP approval rates are positively associated with ownership concentration as measured by Blockholdings. This finding, which is in line with prior literature (e.g. (Rapp, Sperling and Wolff 2010) ), is consistent with the view that large shareholders, which often have an intimate relationship with the supervisory board, influence board decisions already prior to AGMs.
The other specifications of Table 10 are versions of Empirical Model 4: Specification 2 documents that SoP votes have lower approval rates than the average AGM agenda item. Specification 3 and 4 suggest that this is particularly true for firms with high free float. Indeed, Specification 4 documents that the difference between SoP votes and the average AGM agenda item is negligible for firms with zero free float, while it is significant for firms with high levels of free float. Specification 5 and 6 suggest that the approval rate for SoP votes is negatively (although insignificantly) affected by abnormal AGM participation. Finally, Specification 7 to 10 document that SoP approval rates are relatively lower (less negative) when the firm pays high (low) executive compensation. Also, Specification 8 and 10 document that the level of free float is particularly influential in case of (abnormally) high executive pay.
Overall, our results suggest that (small) shareholders raise their voice in SoP votes expressing their view on executive remuneration policies: As a result, this means that -in line with Bebchuck & Fried (2003) -(small) shareholders consider executive compensation a part of the agency problem of listed firms (instead of the outcome of a bargaining process at arm's length).
Robustness
In order to check the validity of our results, we challenge them by a battery of robustness tests. Our key results prove robust under all these additional tests. We proceed in three steps. First, we compare the outcome of SoP votes with approval rates of various selected types of agenda items. Instead of comparing SoP approval with the AGMs' average approval rate, we use "Approval of actions of the supervisory board" and "Mandating of auditors". Compare with Table 14 in the appendix. Second, even though we believe the AGM fixed effects specification is the best way to counter firm heterogeneity and potential endogeneity concerns 15 , we run a Heckman selection model. For this, we estimate the propensity for SoP to obtain the inverse mills ratio, which in the second step regression is not significant. We therefore postulate that there is no selection bias associated with the SoP approval rates. The results confirms our view on AGM fixed effects representing the best-fitted specification. Compare with Table 15 in the appendix.
Thirdly, we re-estimate the models using an alternative endogenous variable. Instead of using Approval
Rate in percent we use the natural logarithm of the ratio Approval Rate in % /(100 -Approval Rate in %).
SoP and AGM participation
Having studied the occurrence of voluntary SoP votes and their approval rates, we examine AGM participation and SoP votes.
Empirical design
Aiming to understand AGM participation, and the association with SoP votes, we use AGM participation rates as reported in the firms AGM voting result summaries as dependent variable. This measure is derived by taking votes present at the AGM, over the total number of votes eligible to participate. As a second measure of participation, to circumvent any potential zero/one restriction of the AGM participation variable, we derive AGM participation (adj) by taking the natural logarithm of AGM participation over AGM absence (AGM absence representing the eligible votes reported not to be present at the AGM). Due to large blockowners participation being relatively consistent and independent of the decision whether a SoP vote 15 With SoP representing an endogenous choice, using AGM fixed effects, we only compare SoP approval with other agenda items also effected by the endogenous choice has been precipitated, we follow the literature (Elst 2011) we introduce Small holder participation (SHP) as a third measure. We calculate SHP by subtracting Blockownership from AGM participation and then normalise this number by the total amount of shares held by small shareholders, so that the variable reads: SHP 
To allow for (constant) unobserved heterogeneity across firms, we use a firm fixed effects model. Additionally we introduce year dummies. Also in this model, we use robust standard errors to allow for heteroskedasticity (White 1980 , Freedman 2006 
AGM Participation and SoP votes
We now report the results of our analysis of AGM participation and SoP approval rates of our Empirical (White, 1980) . Our goodness of fit measure is R2.
Source: Own preparation 
Robustness tests
To counter endogenous selection concerns, we also estimate a selection model. Using treatreg, we again estimate the propensity for SoP in a first step. As an exogenous proxy we use Media presence in a first step, alongside other independent variables also used in the second step. In the second step, we use the estimated outcomes for SoP, to examine the effect of SoP on AGM Participation. The results are reported in Table 16 in the appendix. Our initial firm fixed effects specification is confirmed, with SoP remaining positive and highly significant. The results are furthermore robust to alternative Firm size, ownership and compensation proxies. Additional sample restrictions either for financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) or financial firms and utility firms (SIC codes between 6000 to 6999 and 4900 to 4949) confirm our results.
SoP and AGM participation
With these additional insights on the precipitation of SoP, SoP approval and the influence of SoP, we will now examine SoP and executive compensation in a final analysis.
Empirical design
Aiming to understand if the regulatory enactments in Germany influence SoP, we now utilize the compensation data drawn from previous studies (Rapp and Wolff 2014) . In a first step, we use the natural logarithm of total compensation per person as dependent variable and then switch to the relative share within total compensation of share based incentives. The latter variable provides the degree of pay-for-performance in total executive compensation. We use this measure as a proxy for the alignment of the executive board members and shareholders. To explain our compensation measure we use Share-based-Incentives -SBI (dummy), a dummy suggesting whether management receives share based incentives, as well as firm characteristics.
Empirical Model 6:
To allow for (constant) unobserved heterogeneity across firms, we use a firm fixed effects model. Additionally we introduce year dummies. Also in this model, we use robust standard errors to allow for heteroskedasticity (White 1980 , Freedman 2006 ).
AGM Participation and SoP votes
We now report the results of our analysis of executive compensation and SoP approval rates of our Empirical Model 6. In our first specification, looking at the logarithm of total executive compensation per person -Exec.
Comp (ln), regressed on SoP vote (including three of its lags) as well as firm controls, we do not see any significant and lasting impact on compensation. However, a positive impact on the pay for performance sensitivity of compensation is visible. This effect becomes stronger when we allow SoP to feed through via lags in the years post holding the vote, which implies that the effect SoP has on executive compensation is delayed. This result remains relatively constant when we control for firm characteristics. Table 12 reports firm fixed effects estimates of our model (6) explaining total executive compensation and pay for performance sensitivity. Our sample covers all firms listed in the Prime Standard between 2006 and 2013, providing 2,396 observed AGMs. We thereby use the natural log of executive compensation per board member and share based incentives as a fraction of total compensation as dependent variables. Our main explanatory variable is SoP voti ng (dummy), later expanded with its own (up to three) lags. Further exogenous variables we use are SBI (dummy), Blockholdings and firm controls. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficients, allowing for heteroskedasticity using the Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance (White, 1980) . Our goodness of fit measure is R2.
Source: Own preparation The results are robust to alternative Firm size, ownership and compensation proxies. Additional sample restrictions either for financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) or financial firms and utility firms (SIC codes between 6000 to 6999 and 4900 to 4949) confirm our results.
Conclusion and outlook
Since the introduction of SoP in the United Kingdom, the SoP environment has changed fast and the debate around granting shareholders a SoP continues. Taking advantage of a regulatory change in Germany in 2010, institutionalising voluntary, non-binding SoP votes, we examine the determinants of SoP votes, the approval rates of SoPV, and the effect of SoPV on AGM participation. Our sample covers 1,169 AGMs of all German Prime Standard listed firms with more than 10,000 agenda items over the period 2010 to 2013.
We find that, on a cross sectional perspective, SoP votes were held just over half of our sample firms.
Looking over the four years of SoP history, 20% of our sample AGMs contained SoP votes.
Following previous studies (Rapp, Sperling and Wolff 2010, Drefahl and Pelger 2013, Eulerich, Kalinichenko and Theis 2014), we conduct a cross sectional analysis on the determinants of the propensity to grant shareholders SoP votes. We find the propensity for a SoP vote increases with firm size, abnormal executive compensation and free float of shares. Indeed, smaller firms with concentrated ownership do not only have a lower propensity for a SoP vote, but also show a higher propensity to opt for only limited disclosure of executive compensation. This finding indicates that SoP in Germany does encourage executives to seek legitimacy from their shareholders for compensation packages, especially if they are in an environment prone to excessive managerial power.
With respect to approval rates of SoP votes, we find approval rates of SoP votes are lower than the approval rate for the average AGM agenda item, in particular for firms with a dispersed shareholder base.
This effect is increasing in (i) free float as well as for (ii) firms with abnormal executive compensation. As expected, the existence of blockholders counteracts this tendency, most likely due to coordination between supervisory board and blockholders prior to granting a vote. We interpret this result as shareholders making use of the possibility to express their views on the executive compensation systems in place.
With regard to the effect on AGM participation, we find that SoP votes actually can increase AGM participation, however, only with widely held firms. This finding puts a new perspective on SoP, as it implies shareholders engagement with firms is increased via SoP.
Finally, our analysis on executive compensation and SoP covers compensation data from 2006 to 2013.
While we cannot find any impact on total compensation levels, our insights suggests that the voluntary SoP regime in Germany has strengthened pay for performance elements in executive compensation.
Overall, our results are consistent with the view that firms use voluntary SoP votes to gain legitimation for executive remuneration policies in firms with low ownership concentration, where (small) shareholders consider executive compensation a part of the agency problem of listed firms, and where (small) shareholders considers SoP votes as a possibility to actively influence corporate decisions. While the debate on the costs and benefits of SoP will continue, our study enriches the discussion with insights into a broad set of data and novel analysis. The fundamental analysis conducted in previous studies is extended, providing a less biased idea of SoP approval rates, SoP impact on shareholder engagement through participation rates at AGMs and showing how SoP impacts executive compensation by strengthening pay for performance. Table 13 reports the used variables, their definitions and sources. Ownership variables are collected from the Hoppenstedt Aktienführer and combined with founding family information from firm's annual reports, Lexis-Nexis, Who-is who webpage, and further web and press search. Say on pay information is hand collected from AGM invites as well as decision summaries. Accounting information is from Thomson Financial. Table 14 reports the relevant AGM fixed effects estimates of our model (3) explaining the AGM approval rates relative two specific items. As a comparison we pic "Approval of actions of the supervisory board" and "Mandating of auditors". Our sample covers all firms listed in the Prime Standard between 2010 and 2013. For the 1,169 observed AGMs, we analyse 9,324 AGM agenda items. We thereby measure approval as the sum of votes in favour of the AGM agenda item in question, over the total number of votes submitted. To account for any kind of heterogeneity between different AGMs in our sample we introduce AGM fixed effects. Our main explanatory variable is SoP, to determine the influence of SoP vote on the approval rate. We furthermore introduce a Widely Held dummy indicating whether the firms' three largest shareholders own less than 50% of all voting rights (taking on the value one if this is the case and zero otherwise, i.e. when the free float is less than fifty percent). Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficients, allowing for heteroskedasticity using the Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance (White, 1980) . Our goodness of fit measure is the R2.
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